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Abstract
Recent digital technological advances have not yet reached the smallholder farming communities in
developing economies. Prevailing business models support farmers to trade mainly at informal markets
where farmers receive significantly low prices. Research claims that building trustworthy buyer-seller
relationships can promote farmers’ participation in emerging markets that provide rich opportunities
for them. Thus, we propose a mechanism to enhance trust between farmers and buyers, demonstrating
the transition from a spot market to sophisticated markets when facilitated in a blockchain platform.
We present how micro-level trust can evolve into macro-level trust and then onto social capital and
digital social identity, leading to novel business models. We validate how micro-level trust can be
established with a selection of a permissioned blockchain platform, Hyperledger Fabric, with an
implementation of a spot market. The proposed business model is applicable to other industries where
the seller-buyer relationship is the focal point.
Keywords agriculture, business models, trust, blockchain, farmers.
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1 Introduction
Recent advances in digital technologies have engendered dramatic changes in society, the economy and
organisations via disruptive and dynamic business models. These advancements have not yet reached
the agriculture domain in developing economies to enhance the business models for smallholder
farmers. With existing business models, the majority of smallholder farmers sell their harvest at
informal markets (Di Giovanni et al. 2012; Fafchamps and Hill 2005; Somashekhar et al. 2014; Yundra
and Sumarlan 2021), where they receive only a third to half of the retail price of fruits and vegetables
(Hamangoda and Pushpakumari 2020; Mitra et al. 2018; Somashekhar et al. 2014). Lu et al. (2008)
claim that building trustworthy buyer-seller relationships can promote farmers’ participation in
emerging markets that provide rich opportunities for farmers to get an increased income for a highquality harvest.
A smooth buyer-seller relationship depends on both contractual trust and competence trust. While
contractual trust is expecting the promises to be kept, competence trust is self-reliance on the trading
partner’s capability to carry out the tasks in the transaction (Sako 1992). In today’s digital world, most
transactions happen in an electronic commerce environment. Tan and Thoen (2002) declare that
transaction trust in electronic commerce depends on the trust placed in the counterparty (party trust)
who engages in the transaction, trust in the control mechanism (control trust), potential gain, and the
risks associated with the transaction. The control mechanism defines the procedures and protocols that
monitor and control the successful performance of a transaction. Blockchain technology, a peer-to-peer
distributed ledger technology that enables immutable, transparent, cheaper, faster, trustworthy, and
secure transactions (Underwood 2016), is an exemplary mechanism to implement the control
mechanism due to its potential to establish control trust with impeccable characteristics such as nonrepudiation, authentication and integrity. It also facilitates party trust via untamperable history of
transactions.
Based on the properties of blockchains, in our earlier research, we have conceptualised three possible
market models: a spot market where harvest and money are exchanged on the spot, smart contracts
market that allows establishing smart contracts between farmers and buyers in advance, and smart
futures contracts market that allows establishing smart futures contracts between farmers and buyers
(Kumarathunga et al. 2022). An essential requirement for this conceptual model to work is having a
practical way to create the necessary level of trust.
This paper presents the blockchain-based framework we developed to create micro-level trust between
farmers and buyers that can lead to macro-level trust and, thereon, to social capital, which refers to a
network of community relationships that facilitate trust and motivate purposeful actions (Bourdieu
2018). Empirical evidence shows how social capital enhances an individual’s social identity and viceversa (Kramer 2006). Thus, through a stepwise implementation of markets, it is possible to gradually
establish social capital and digital social identity for farmers, buyers, and the farming community
(Kumarathunga et al. 2022).
We further demonstrate how each market contributes to building trust when deployed in a correctly
chosen blockchain platform. We implement the spot market in a blockchain platform to evaluate the
transition of micro-level trust to social capital, enabling control trust and party trust, before
implementing it on a commercial level.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide the literature review on
existing agribusiness models from the farmers’ perspective, leading to the research approach in section
3. We present the novel business model, implementation including the selection of a blockchain
platform, and evaluation of the spot market in section 4 and then the discussion in section 5. The
conclusions are presented in section 6.

2 Literature Review
2.1 Agribusiness Models – From a Farmer’s Viewpoint
There are distinct types of business models associated with agriculture. The simplest is the spot market,
which is characterised by fewer barriers to entry, high transaction costs, and low returns. Another
business model is where the farmers produce relatively undifferentiated crops for contracts to a known
buyer. The model has potential barriers to entry, moderate risk of financial loss, and low transaction
costs. The contract production to a known buyer for quality differentiated crops business model has
higher barriers to entry, higher potential of financial returns, and higher risks (Boughton et al. 2007).
In all these scenarios, money and material flows directly happen between the buyer and farmer. There
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is evidence that they receive only a third to half of the retail price of fruits and vegetables (Hamangoda
and Pushpakumari 2020; Mitra et al. 2018; Somashekhar et al. 2014).
A case study from Sri Lanka reveals that while some farmers engage in spot marketing in the local
market, where the selling price changes vigorously, 90% of farmers depend on a middleman or a
shopkeeper to sell their harvest (Di Giovanni et al. 2012). Similarly, in India, fruit and vegetable farmers
heavily depend on intermediaries to sell their harvest (Somashekhar et al. 2014). Mitra et al. (2018)
claim that middlemen collect between 50% and 71% of the price difference between farm-gate and resale
prices. Coffee from Ugandan farmers is bought by either an itinerant trader or a middleman. Middlemen
also purchase coffee from itinerant traders who bought coffee from farmers, mill and sort them to be
exported to a coffeehouse in Europe or elsewhere (Fafchamps and Hill 2005). According to Yundra and
Sumarlan (2021), lowland rice in Jogoroto District in Indonesia is distributed in three trading patterns:
from farmers to middlemen traders to rice mills to collectors to retailers to consumers, from farmers to
middlemen to rice mills to retailers to consumers, and from farmers to rice mills to collectors to retailers
to consumers. In addition, farmers sell their rice to a barn where rice is processed, packaged, labelled,
and distributed to retailers.
The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates a comprehensive accumulation of all the business models included
in this section.

Figure 1: Existing Agribusiness Models (Farmer’s Perspective)
When the transaction happens directly between the farmer and buyer, it can be either spot market or
contract farming. Often researchers claim that contract farming generates greater benefits for farmers
with timely payments and fixed rates (Ray et al. 2021). Singh (2002) discloses that contract vegetable
production in Punjab state in India is associated with a series of problems: imbalanced power between
farmers and buyers, violation of the agreements, social differentiation, and environmental
sustainability. When the prices provided by the buyers are too low and unfair, farmers tend to do side
marketing, breaching the contracts (Dzingirai 2003). The literature reports farmers in Pakistan are
willing to join maize contract farming when they are confident that the buyer is reliable (Khan et al.
2019). However, the majority of marginal farmers are excluded from contract farming due to the small
land size that can produce small quantities of harvest (Ray et al. 2021). These happenings indicate the
requirement for disruptive business models that can generate richer opportunities for these
underprivileged farmers.

3 Research Approach
This research follows the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology, a method of addressing
important unsolved problems in unique or innovative ways or solved problems in more effective or
efficient ways. DSR consists of 3 cycles: Relevance Cycle (RC), Rigour Cycle (RgC), and Design Cycle
(DC) (Hevner and Chatterjee 2010).
The relevance cycle provides the requirements for the research and defines the acceptance criteria for
the ultimate evaluation of the research results. The rigour cycle provides past knowledge to ensure
innovation with the selection and application of appropriate theories for constructing and evaluating
the artefact. The design cycle focuses on generating design alternatives and evaluating the alternatives
against requirements until a satisfactory design is generated (Hevner and Chatterjee 2010).
We had several iterations of the three cycles that led us to conceptualise three possible market models:
a spot market, a smart contracts market, and a smart futures contracts market. We focused on
enhancing financial inclusion among smallholder farmers by exploring ways to solve the issues related
to the lack of trusted buyers and microfinance (Kumarathunga et al. 2022). Solving for lack of trusted
buyers led us to develop the blockchain-based framework. This framework incorporated four major
features to enhance farmers’ margins.
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•

Enabling farmers to sell their expected harvest as smart futures contracts to mitigate future
price uncertainties, using social capital as collateral.

•

Empowering farmers to establish trustworthy relationships with reputable buyers who offer
higher prices, reducing transaction-related risks.

•

Establishing Many-one-Many (MoM) market linkages that support community-wise
aggregated marketing, providing high bargaining power to farmers, enabling them to access
bigger markets, leading to better prices.

•

Facilitating farmers to receive some cash in advance, enabling them to purchase high-quality
Agri inputs to produce a high-quality harvest that attracts higher rates, mitigating financial
risks.

The crucial requirement for this conceptual model to work is having a practical way to create the
necessary level of trust for each of the market models. The blockchain-based framework enables microlevel trust among farmers and buyers that can lead to macro-level trust. This trust establishment
generates a network of trust relationships over time, leading to social capital and social identity. We
implement the spot market in the blockchain platform to evaluate the transition of micro-level trust to
social capital, enabling control trust and party trust as specified by Tan and Thoen (2002).

4 Novel Business Model
Our novel business model consists of three markets implemented in the blockchain platform as
represented in Figure 2. The numbers 1,2,3 is used to represent the timing and order of the flows.

Figure 2: Novel Business Model with 3 Markets
•

Spot Market: In the spot market, a buyer agrees to buy from a group of farmers and this
agreement is recorded in the blockchain. On the agreed date, they meet and exchange the
harvest and the money concurrently. The numbers 1 and 1 in the two arrows in Figure 2
represent these synchronous flows. These transactions are recorded in the blockchain as
fulfilled agreements. This information is used to enhance the level of trust in the buyers and
farmers, enabling party trust.

•

Smart Contracts Market: When there is a sufficient level of trust in a buyer, farmers will be
willing to deliver the harvest first and receive the money later. The order of these asynchronous
flows is represented by numbers 2 and 3 in Figure 2. This is the prevailing model at present in
which farmers are selling to trusted buyers or brokers where history indicates that they will get
paid on a future date. The issue is there are only a small number of buyers with this level of trust
(Kumarathunga et al. 2021). Thus, farmers have less bargaining power to get a high price. With
the new online business model, farmers can connect with more buyers over time to
establish contracts in advance with enhanced bargaining power.

•

Smart Futures Contracts Market: When farmers build a sufficient level of trust with the
emergence of competence trust and contractual trust, the buyers will be willing to enter
into a contract with farmers and pay some money upfront to ensure the supply. The
numbers 2 and 3 in Figure 2 denote this asynchronous order. With the possibility of a cash
advance, the need for a farmer to get a microfinance loan to cover the cost of cultivation can be
eliminated. The literature reports getting a microfinance loan has often resulted in undesirable
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side effects, especially if the farmer cannot obtain the expected harvest due to unforeseen
circumstances (Kumarathunga et al. 2022).
Implementation of the spot market in a proper blockchain platform establishes control trust, leading to
micro-level trust. This micro-level trust enables farmers and buyers to establish contracts in advance
for the expected harvest. The establishment of contracts in the form of smart contracts and tamperproof records in the blockchain establish contractual trust and competence trust, leading to party trust
at the macro level. When macro-level trust is established between the farmers and buyers, the potential
of developing a network of trust relationships is enhanced. That is indicated as social capital. Figure 3
demonstrates this process of establishing trust between farmers and buyers from micro-level trust to
macro-level trust and, thereon, to social capital.

Figure 3: Evolution of Trust Represented as a State Machine Diagram

4.1 Implementation of the Spot Market on a Blockchain Platform
4.1.1 Blockchain Technology
Blockchain is a peer-to-peer network of computers that holds a replicated and synchronized open
ledger. The ledger has a replicated copy of a set of records called blocks. Each block in a blockchain
consists of multiple transactions. A cryptographic hash pointer links each block to the previous block.
The blocks are timestamped to record the exact time of creation (Verma and Garg 2017). These
timestamped and linked blocks create a chain of blocks, engendering the blockchain (Christidis and
Devetsikiotis 2016). Blockchain technology provides many desirable properties to build trust for an
application and among the users of that application (Bashir 2020).
•

Decentralization: There is no need for a trusted intermediary to validate transactions. Instead,
a consensus is achieved among participating nodes to validate transactions.

•

Transparency and Trust: Blockchains are transparent among the participating nodes since all
the nodes consist of a copy of the same ledger, leading to trust establishment.

•

Immutability: The data recorded in the blockchain is immutable due to the infeasibility of
altering data in all subsequent blocks of the replicated ledgers on all participating nodes in the
network.

•

High availability: Since a blockchain network is a peer-to-peer network with multiple nodes
that consist of replicated and updated ledgers, the network becomes highly available.
Inaccessibility or unavailability of some nodes does not affect the availability of the network.
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•

Highly secure: Any transaction broadcasted to a blockchain network is verified based on a
predetermined set of rules. The valid transactions are hashed and included in a block with a
timestamp. Thus, the blockchain network provides integrity with cryptographically secured
data by its design.

•

Non-repudiation: Participants of a transaction cannot deny the transaction and behaviour in
the transaction in the blockchain due to non-repudiation property. The non-repudiation service
collects, maintains, provides, and verifies the undeniable evidence about
transactions/messages from the sender to the receiver. Thus, a sender cannot deny sending a
transaction, while the receiver cannot deny receiving that transaction.

•

Authentication: When a transaction is initiated, the verifying nodes authenticate the digital
signature using the sender’s public key to ensure that the signature is created only by the sender,
who possesses the corresponding secret private key.

•

Simplification of current paradigms: Blockchain facilitates maintaining a shared ledger among
interested stakeholders, simplifying the complexity of managing separate systems with
centralized databases.

•

Faster Dealing Settlements: Since blockchain does not require a lengthy process of verification,
reconciliation, and clearance due to the availability of a single version of agreed-upon data on a
shared ledger, blockchain can enable quick settlements of trades.

•

Cost-saving: Since no fees are paid to a third party or a clearing house, overhead costs are
eliminated significantly.

•

Platform for smart contracts: Blockchain technology provides a platform for deploying smart
contracts that are automated, autonomous programs with encapsulated business logic, and
code to execute a required function when certain conditions are met.

•

Cryptographic Tokens: Blockchain technology provides an underline infrastructure for
programmable assets or access rights that represent anything from a store of value to a set of
permissions in the physical, digital, and legal world as cryptographic tokens. Blockchain enables
tokenomics, circumventing the double-spending problem.

4.1.2 Selection of a Blockchain Platform
Of the above-mentioned 12 aspects of the blockchain, 11 aspects are applicable to the proposed business
model except the one mentioned as simplification of current paradigms. However, the most critical
features are immutability, smart contracts and cryptographic tokens since the farmer converts some or
all of his expected harvest to token contracts in the form of smart futures contracts in the third version
of the proposed market. When a buyer purchases a token contract, a new smart contract is deployed
into the blockchain with pre-defined conditions to transfer ownership of the digital asset once the
conditions are met. Thus, a blockchain platform that allows deploying smart contracts can be chosen
for the proposed implementation.
However, like in many other technologies, research is in progress to improve the robustness,
accessibility, and usefulness of the blockchain, mitigating sensitive problems. The most sensitive
problems related to blockchain are as follows (Bashir 2020).


Scalability: When compared with current financial networks, blockchain stands far behind.
However, researchers have proposed many impeccable solutions for this.



Adoption: Although blockchain is considered a nascent technology, there is still a lack of mass
adoption.



Regulation: In blockchain networks, there is no regulatory authority or central control. This
becomes a barrier to adoption since consumers are unable to build up confidence by holding
someone accountable when there are disputes.



Relatively immature technology: Since blockchain is still an emerging technology, it requires a
lot of research to achieve maturity when compared with traditional IT systems.



Privacy and confidentiality: Transparent feature in the blockchain is not desirable in industries
such as financial, law and medical sectors where privacy and confidentiality hold higher values.
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Thus, we analyse the existing blockchain platforms based on the properties and the sensitive problems
that blockchain technology brings to an application. There are two basic types of blockchain platforms
according to the scheme of ledger sharing and who is allowed to participate (Bashir 2020).


Permissionless: Open and distributed blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum allow any peer
to join or leave the platform as a reader or writer, even illegitimate ones. The nodes, called
miners, perform a sophisticated mining process to validate blocks before adding them to the
blockchain. While some (Eg: Ethereum) facilitate deploying smart contracts, some (Eg: Bitcoin)
are not.



Permissioned: A consortium, a group of entities, manages the membership of the individual
peers in the network. While policies defined by the consortium decide the reading/writing
rights, pre-defined nodes engage in block validation without a mining process. Hyperledger
Fabric (HyperLedger Fabric 2022) is an instance of a permissioned blockchain.

Implementation of the novel business model into a system requires an appropriate blockchain platform
that maximizes the positive impacts while mitigating the negatives. The main actors of the proposed
system are farmers, buyers, and organizations that maintain the blockchain platform. Many farmers
and some buyers may not be tech-savvy enough to maintain a full node or be minor in a blockchain
platform. They may also not have sufficient computational power for the mining process and
maintaining a full node. Thus, a blockchain where the mining process is used to validate blocks (Bashir
2020) is not suitable for the proposed implementation.
Furthermore, the required blockchain network should not be open to everybody. Only authorized
farmers, authorized buyers, and relevant organizations are allowed to participate in the blockchain
platform. Thus, a permissionless blockchain, where anyone can participate as a node in the decisionmaking process (Bashir 2020), is not a good choice. In addition, the full transparency provided by such
blockchains is not acceptable for this use case since the platform should enable farmers to sell their
harvest as token contracts at competitive prices to different buyers without disclosing the farmer or
farm details. Thus, the full transparency feature of permissionless blockchains (Bashir 2020) does not
match the requirement of maintaining some private data.
Moreover, the proposed business model targets smallholder farmers although large-scale farmers are
also allowed. Most of these marginal farmers would not prefer to pay a transaction fee for each
transaction they do for the expensive mining process in the permissionless blockchains (Bashir 2020).
Therefore, a permissionless blockchain can deter many farmers from the proposed system.
Therefore, permissioned blockchains are better suited for the requirements of the implementation of
the proposed business model. First, the permissioned blockchains support consensus protocols that
validate transactions and blocks without the need for a native cryptocurrency to offer mining incentives.
Second, they only allow groups or individuals who agreed to share the ledger among themselves. Third,
permissioned blockchains allow to store both public and private data (Bashir 2020). Moreover, the
contemplation of sensitive problems of the blockchains mentioned above, a permissionless blockchain
cannot compete with permissioned blockchains in the scope of scalability, privacy and confidentiality
issues. In addition, a permissioned blockchain consists of a group of entities to decide the policies in the
network. Thus, the availability of a regulatory authority leads to participants’ confidence improvement,
building trust in the platform (HyperLedger Fabric 2022). Trust is the fundamental building block of
this business model. Thus, we can conclude that permissioned blockchains are the best choice for this
implementation.
Although there are many permissioned blockchains, the fact that most of them are still nascent led us
to choose the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain for this implementation since it is one of the most mature
ones. Also, it is open source. The fact that it is hosted by the Linux Foundation made us more confident
in choosing it due to the widespread community support. More importantly, it supports developing
smart contracts with three general-purpose programming languages: Nodejs, Javascript, and Go,
soothing the development process. Besides, it has a modular architecture that enables plug-in identity
or key management protocols, supporting the management and safeguarding of digital keys and
minimizing the possibility of losing keys due to human error (HyperLedger Fabric 2022).

4.1.3 Implementation of the Blockchain Network in Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric (HF) network consists of nodes called Peers and Orderers. Peer nodes host the
ledgers and smart contracts. Applications are connected to the peer nodes to access ledgers by invoking
a chaincode (smart contract) deployed in peers. Orderer nodes order the transactions received from all
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peers to generate a new block that will be broadcasted to all the peers in the network. All the peer nodes
and orderer nodes connect with each other in a channel (HyperLedger Fabric 2022).
Thus, for the proposed business model, an HF network is designed with 4 peer nodes (2 peer nodes per
organization) and 3 orderer nodes for a consortium of 2 organizations in a local Ubuntu virtual machine
as depicted in Figure 4. Thus, 4 CouchDB databases are hosted for the 4 ledgers. Four peer nodes and
3 orderer nodes are running in separate Docker containers. A chaincode is deployed in all 4 peers to
access the ledger for read/write functions. A serverside Javascript app is developed to connect with
peers. All peers are accessible to users registered in both organizations. Once the ledgers are initialised,
the CouchDB databases are accessible through an assigned port in the localhost.

Figure 4: HF Network Structure
We developed two web sites: one for farmers and one for buyers, enabling them to access the HF
blockchain network.

4.2 Evaluation of the Spot Market in HF
According to the DSR methodology, the design artefacts should be evaluated against the requirements
gathered during the RC (Hevner 2007). One requirement of the spot market is generating the initial
building block for trust building via the tamper-proof history of records and smart contracts in the
chosen blockchain platform: HF. Since the last two markets will be built on the base of progressively
developed online trust, leading to social capital that can be used as collateral in future financial
exchanges, establishing the bottom line foundation with a thorough evaluation is vital. Thus, evaluating
whether the spot market in HF assists in establishing micro-level trust is crucial for the quality utility
of the artefact as well as the research outcome.
For evaluation, we chose the Framework for Evaluation In Design Science (FEDS) proposed by Venable
et al. (2016). According to the FEDS framework, when the major design risk is technically oriented,
researchers may choose the technical risk & efficacy evaluation strategy and begin with the formative
end, in which evaluations must provide a basis for successful action. The evaluation can consist of
several episodes to continue towards the summative end, in which evaluations must create a consistent
interpretation across shared meanings. Since micro-level trust can be gradually transformed into
macro-level trust, the first and second episodes of evaluation are targeted toward the rigour and
technical risk of the spot market and the establishment of control trust and micro-level trust. Thus, the
evaluation episodes are as follows.
Episode 1: Technical risk & efficacy strategy at the formative end


Goals: Technical Risk and Suitability of the Chosen Blockchain Platform, Establishment of
Control Trust and Micro-Level Trust



In this episode, we have analysed the records in the ledgers in all the peer nodes, retrieve them,
try to alter them, add new contracts to confirm the applicatory of Hyperledger Fabric.



At the end a report is prepared on the suitability of Hyperledger Fabric, control trust, and
micro-level trust

Episode 2: Technical risk & efficacy strategy at the formative end


Goals: Rigour and Technical Risk, Establishment of Control Trust and Micro-Level Trust



In this episode, we hired some users to act as farmers and buyers, asked them to use the
platform, perform successful/unsuccessful transactions with imaginary money and harvest,
establish contracts while using the evolving ranks as trust indicators
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At the end they will be given a questionnaire to answer open ended question regarding expected
outcomes: control trust, micro-level trust and technical aspect

While Episode 2 is in progress, Episode 1 is carried out for the spot market deployed in a local virtual
machine environment as described in section 4.1.3. The evaluation disclosed that an authorized user
could read/write transactions to the ledger and update the values in the existing transactions (Eg: price,
the quantity of the contract). Therefore, in real-life development, a proper membership management
mechanism in the HF network should be maintained and audited. Since the ledgers are running in 4
CouchDB databases in local Docker containers, they are accessible for altering data. However, altering
data in one database did not change the world state of the blockchain. Altering the same record in all 4
databases did change the world state of the blockchain. When the HF network is hosted in the real
environment, these databases can only be accessed by the administrators of the participating
organizations, and thus, are not available for normal users. Moreover, organization administrators can
access their ledger only. Hence, altering data in all ledgers is infeasible. Thus, the evaluation reveals
that with a proper membership management mechanism, HF is a match for the proposed business
model implementation. Since it fulfilled the requirements of the design, episode 1 confirmed that the
spot market in HF has the potential of establishing micro-level trust by establishing control trust and
enabling party trust.

5 Discussion
Inherent properties of blockchain technology have the potential to generate social capital via the
establishment of party trust, competence trust, and contractual trust, as illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: How Blockchain Enables Social Capital
Due to the non-repudiation feature, the participants cannot deny their behaviour in the digital
environment. In blockchains, this feature is supported through digital signature schemes that facilitate
message authentication and data integrity (Bashir 2020). While the message authentication feature
confirms the sender who created the message, leading to party trust, the data integrity feature ensures
that message is not altered during the transit, leading to control trust. Thus, the non-repudiation feature
contributes to building both control trust and party trust.
Information reliability that influences trust automation (Kraus et al. 2019) can be achieved with
immutability and transparency features. When the control mechanism provides reliable information
about transactions and users, control trust and party trust are built up among the participants. In
addition, the automatic execution of smart contracts contributes to establishing control trust and
contractual trust.
Gradual enrichment of party trust, competence trust, and contractual trust can lead to the development
of a network of trusted relationships among community members over time that refers to as the social
capital for individuals in this digital environment. This social capital enables the novel business model
that facilitates the three types of markets. While the spot market enables trading when the harvest is
ready, both other two markets support trading the expected harvest in advance while the crops are still
growing, reducing future price risks. In addition, the smart futures contracts market facilitates trading
smart futures contracts on behalf of the expected harvest, enabling farmers to receive some money
beforehand using social capital as collateral, mitigating the microfinance burden. Implementation of
this business model in a real environment stands out from similar blockchain markets due to the MoM
market linkages (Kumarathunga et al. 2020) that support aggregated marketing.
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With the tamper-proof history of transactions, farmers, buyers, and the farmers’ community receive a
calculated rank. This rank represents a digital identity for the farmers’ community, generating a
community brand, leading to a brand reputation. This reputation empowers smallholder farmers to
trade their harvest under a reputed brand name, which is challenging for an individual farmer to
develop. In addition, obtaining certificates for their products or growing methods becomes
straightforward with the community’s reputation.
According to the requirements of the proposed business model, HF is one of the best choices for
blockchain network development due to the governance by a consortium, leading to control trust. The
evaluation of Episode 1 reveals that with proper membership management protocol, control trust can
be further enhanced while establishing party trust. The untamperable records and smart contracts
engender competence trust and contractual trust in order. Thus, the proposed business model satisfies
the requirements for transaction trust proposed by Tan and Thoen (2002) and the requirements for a
smooth trading relationship by Sako (1992).

6 Conclusion
Recent digital technological advances engender dramatic changes in society, the economy, and
organisations via new business models. Trust plays a vital role in enabling such business models. In this
paper, we have demonstrated an approach to establishing trust using blockchain technology. Using this
ability to establish trust, we have developed a set of novel business models to enhance the margins
generated by impoverished smallholder farmers. These business models range from a blockchain-based
spot market to a smart contracts market and, thereon, to a smart futures contracts market.
We demonstrated how to establish micro-level trust between farmers and buyers by selecting a
permissioned blockchain platform to implement the spot market. Implementation of the smart
contracts market could upgrade this micro-level trust into macro-level trust and, thereon, to social
capital, enabling the smart futures contracts market. The proposed business model can be applied to
other industries where the seller-buyer relationship is the focal point of the business. We expect
implementing these business models among underprivileged farming communities will upgrade their
living standards, leading to poverty alleviation.
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